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NOTES
NOTES
STATUS OF SHORT TERM TRUSTS AND TRUSTS WHERE THE
CONTROL REMAINS IN THE GRANTOR UNDER
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
BACKGROUND OF THE TAXATION TO THE GRANTOR OF INCOME
FROM TRUSTS
The history of the taxation to the grantor of income from
trusts is a history of the attempts of taxpayers to avoid the pay-
ment of taxes in the higher surtax brackets by the use of the
trust device, while still in fact retaining the beneficial use of the
income, and of the frustration of these attempts by statutes and
court decisions. The basis for these attempts is the general rule,
although there are exceptions,' that the income of a trust is not
1. Before the case of Helvering v. Clifford (1940) 309 U. S. 331, the
exceptions to this general rule were provided by §219 (g) and (h) of the
Revenue Act of 1924, and their later versions, §§166 and 167 of the Revenue
Act of 1982, 47 Stat. 221, c. 209 §§166, 167, 26 U. S. C. A. §§166, 167.
Section 166: REVOCABLE TRUSTS
"Where at any time during the taxable year the power to revest in the
grantor title to any part of the corpus of the trust is vested-
(1) in the grantor, either alone or in conjunction with any person not
having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part
of the corpus or the income therefrom, or
(2) in any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the dis-
position of such part of the corpus or the income therefrom, then
the income of such part of the trust for said taxable year shall be
included in computing the net income of the grantor.
Section 167: INCOME FOR THE BENEFIT OF GRANTOR
(a) Where any part of the income of a trust-(1) is, or in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not having
a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the
income may be, held or accumulated for future distribution to the
grantor; or
(2) may, in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not having
a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the
income, be distributed to the grantor; or
(8) is, or in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not having a
substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the
income may be, applied to the payment of premiums upon policies of
insurance on the life of the grantor (except policies of insurance
irrevocably payable for the purposes and in the manner specified in
section 23 (n), relating to the so-called "charitable contribution"
deduction) ;
then such part of the income of the trust shall be included in comput-
ing the net income of the grantor.
(b) As used in this section the term "in the discretion of the grantor"
means "in the discretion of the grantor, either alone or in conjunction
with any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the dis-
position of the part of the income in question."
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taxable to the grantor but to the beneficiary or to the trustee,
according to the nature of the trust.2
Before the Revenue Act of 1924, 3 the income of revocable trusts
was not taxed to the grantor, and therefore the revocable trust
was freely used to distribute property among the family group
of a grantor with a large income, in order to escape the surtaxes
on the higher brackets. 4 In an effort to close this loophole, the
Revenue Act of 1924 provided that the grantor should include
the income from the trust in his gross income, if the trust were
revocable by him during the tax year. This language, however,
permitted grantors, by postponing the power of revocation to a
subsequent year, to avoid the tax during intervening years. Ac-
cordingly, the statute, now Section 166 of the Internal Revenue
Code, was amended in 1932, making trust income taxable to the
grantor, if the trust is revocable by him at any time.0
Another device employed by taxpayers to avoid the higher
brackets was the creation of trusts to pay the premiums on in-
surance on the settlor's life. This loophole too was closed by the
Revenue Act of 1924, which requires the grantor to include in
his gross income, trust income used to carry insurance on his
own life, whether or not the trust was revocable and whether or
not the policies are payable to his estate.7
After the enactment of these statutory expedients to prevent
tax avoidance through trusts, there remained still one possible
avenue of escape. That was the short term irrevocable trust with
2. 4 Paul and Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, (1st ed. 1934)
53, . . .the income of a trust for the taxable year which is distributable
to the beneficiaries must be returned by, and will be taxed to, the respec-
tive beneficiaries, and that the income of a trust which is to be accumulated
or held for future distribution, whether consisting of ordinary income or
gain from the sale of assets included in the corpus of the trust, must be
returned by, and will be taxed to, the trustee."
3. Internal Revenue Code (1924) 43 Stat. 277, c. 234 §219 (g), 26 U. S.
C. A. §166.
4. Altman, Recent Developments in Income Tax Avoidance (1934) 29
Ill. L. Rev. 154, 166. It was later held that revocable trusts set up before
the Revenue Act of 1924 were ineffective for this purpose. O'Donnell v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C. C. A. 9, 1933) 64 F. (2d) 634,
Cert. den. 54 S. Ct. 208.
5. Internal Revenue Code (1924) 43 Stat. 277, c. 234 §219 (g), 26
U. S. C. A. §166. This section was held constitutional in Corliss v. Bowers,
(1929) 281 U. S. 376, on the theory that income "--that is subject to a
man's unfettered command and that he is free to enjoy at his own option
may be taxed to him as his income, whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not."
6. Internal Revenue Code (1932) 47 Stat. 221, c. 209 §166, 26 U. S.
C. A. §166.
7. Internal Revenue Code (1924) 43 Stat. 277, c. 234 §219 (h), 26 U. S.
C. A. §167. This section was held constitutional in Burnet v. Wells, (1933)
289 U. S. 670, even though the trust was irrevocable and the policies were
payable to others than the insured or his estate.
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reversion in the grantor, by means of which, the grantor could
rely upon recovering his property, without the need of reserving
a power of revocation. Such a trust is, of course, hot literally
within the language of Section 166,8 but its purpose and effect
come dangerously close to violating the statutory policy. Ac-
cordingly, the courts, without additional legislative aid, proceeded
in half steps to close up this gap. At first, this was accomplished
by steadily broadening the scope of Sections 1669 and 16710 and
by realistically looking beyond the legal title in each trust, to
determine where the actual dominion over the trust property
lay.
In Corliss v. Bowers," sustaining the constitutionality of Sec-
tion 219 (g), now Section 166,12 the Supreme Court reasoned that
the income from revocable trusts ought to be taxable to the
grantor because he possessed the power to enjoy the income,
whether he actually did so or not. A few years later, in Burnet v.
Wells,23 sustaining the constitutionality of Section 219 (h), now
Section 167,14 Mr. Justice Cardozo recognized a new kind of tax
avoidance effectuated by means of the solidarity of the family
group, which made it possible for the taxpayer "to surrender title
to another and to keep dominion for himself, or, if not technical
dominion, at least the substance of enjoyment," and he issued a
warning to taxpayers seeking to avoid the higher brackets by
means of the trust device, that "escape has been blocked by the
resources of the judicial process without the aid of legislation."' 5
In the companion case of Du Pont v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue,'" the trust, for the benefit of the grantor's family, was
irrevocable for a three year term, renewable for a like term at the
option of the grantor at the end of the period, and the corpus
was composed of stock, the income from which was to pay pre-
miums on policies of insurance on the grantor's life. The deed
made separate provision for the disposition of the policies and
8. Internal Revenue Code (1932) 47 Stat. 221, c. 209 §166, 26 U. S. C. A.§166.
9. Internal Revenue Code (1932) 47 Stat. 221, c. 209 §166, 26 U. S. C. A.
§166.
10. Internal Revenue Code (1932) 47 Stat. 221, c. 209 §167, 26 U. S. C. A.
§167.
11. (1980) 281 U. S. 376.
12. Internal Revenue Code (1932) 47 Stat. 221, c. 209 §166, 26 U. S. C. A.§166.
13. (1938) 289 U. S. 670. Justices Sutherland, Butler, McReynolds, and
Van Devanter dissenting.
14. Internal Revenue Code (1932), 47 Stat. 221, c. 209 §167, 26 U. S.
C. A. §167.
15. (1933) 289 U. 5. 670, 673.
16. (1933) 289 U. S. 685.
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for the distribution of the shares: if the trust was terminated
before the grantor's death, all interest in the policies was to
vest in the beneficiaries and the shares and accumulated income
were to go to the grantor; if, on the other hand, the grantor
died while the policies were in force, the trustee was to collect
the insurance and hold the proceeds in trust for the beneficiaries,
and the shares were to be divided among the grantor's children
or their issue. The Court held the grantor liable for the tax on
the income of the trust because it was within the rule of Burnet
v. Wells,1l that the grantor is liable for the tax on the income
of a trust set up to pay premiums on insurance on the grantor's
life, even though the trust is irrevocable and the policies are
payable to others than the insured or his estate. Justices Van
Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler, who had dis-
sented in Burnet v. Wells 8 on the ground that in that case the
trust was an irrevocable gift, concurred in the Du Pont case for
the reasons stated in the last paragraph of the majority opinion
by Justice Cardozo:
"Here the grantor did not divest himself of the title in any
permanent or definitive way, did not strip himself of every
interest in the subject matter of the trust estate. During a
term of three years the trustee was to apply the income to
the preservation of the policies and while thus applying the
income was to hold the principal intact for the return to the
grantor unless instructed to retain it longer. The situation
in its legal effect would not be greatly different if the trusts
had been created for a month or from day to day. One who
retains for himself so many of the attributes of ownership
is not the victim of despotic power when for the purpose of
taxation he is treated as the owner altogether." 1
The dicta in these cases indicated the trend of the courts and
provided a basis for considering the problem of the short term
trust.
. The next significant decision, Summer v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue,20 concerned an irrevocable trust of securities
for a one year period, the trustee of which was the grantor, and
his wife the beneficiary. The Board of Tax Appeals in taxing
the grantor for the income of the trust, placed its decision
squarely on the Du Pont case since there was in the instant case,
"--as slight a devestiture of title, as much command over the
17. (1933) 289 U. S. .670.
18. (1933) 289 U. S. 670,
19. (1933) 289 U. S. 685, 688.
20. (1939) 40 B. T. A. 811.
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disposition of the trust, a retention of as many attributes of
ownership, here as there were in that case."'21
After the Du Pont case, trust draftsmen with increasing dex-
terity drew up trust instruments which permitted the grantor a
great measure of control over the corpus, without giving him
the power to revest the corpus or income in himself. For exam-
ple, in the case of Warren Corning,22 the grantor made a trust
company the trustee and gave to his father, the power to revoke
or change the beneficial interests. After the death of the grant-
or's father, the grantor retained power to remove the trustee
and substitute another, and to pass upon all trust investments.
The grantor was the income beneficiary for life, his wife to be
life income beneficiary upon the death of the grantor; and if
there were no descendents of the grantor living when the wife
died, the grantor's father was to take the corpus. The grantor's
father, pursuant to his power to alter the terms of the trust,
had provided that the income should be accumulated during the
life of the grantor. No income payments had been made, there-
fore, to the grantor, during the tax years in question. The Board
of Tax Appeals taxed the grantor on the income of the trust
holding that he had the right to revest the corpus in himself
at some time in the future, within the scope of Section 166,23
and that only the power to exercise this right, and not its ex-
istence, was contingent. The Board, not forgetting that the
grantor retained a great deal of control over the corpus, also
fixed the tax liability to the grantor by finally stating the "Sub-
stance of Enjoyment" test!
"Under the rule adopted by some courts and this Board, if
the trusts are of such character that petitioner [grantor]
although transferring the legal title'to a trust, has retained
in himself such general powers of control and management"
that the trust property may be used for his own benefit to
the extent that would give him the 'substance of enjoyment',
then the income is taxable to petitioner [grantor] either
upon the theory that such trusts do not have separate tax-
able entities qr they amount to no-more than an assignment
of income."' '2 -
21. (1989) 40 B. T,,Az 811, 814.
22. Cotning v. Comfiisioner of Internal Revenue (1937) 36 B. T. A.
801.
23. Internal Revenue Act (1932) 47 Stat. 221, c. 209 §166, 26 U. S. C. A.
24.T!d grantor retained power to substitu" trustees. The trustee was
un oe e tr'uit instrument to lendofney to the grantor's estate
t 'En b borpus with6ut liability for loss if he had obtained the ap-
proval of the grantor's father, or, after the dea of the grantor's father,
of the grantor himself. !
25. The Board cited Douglas v. Willcuts (1935) 296 U. S. 1. There, a
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The view of the Board however, was reversed upon appeal where
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the
"Substance of Enjoyment" concept and held that the grantor,
for two reasons, had no power to revest the corpus or income
in himself, within the scope of section 166 :20 first, because his
power to recapture either the corpus or the income was based
upon a contingency which might never occur; and second, be-
cause the father, a possible beneficiary, had the substantial ad-
verse interest required to exempt the trust from the operation
of Section 166.27
Later, in the case of Estate of O'Laughlin, Deceased, First
National Bank of Chicago, as Executor28 the grantor, naming
himself trustee, executed a trust for the benefit of members of
his family and retained vast powers of control over the corpus,
which was composed of stock in a family corporation; the trust
was created in 1931 and was irrevocable by the grantor until
1934, after which the grantor could revoke and regain both the
corpus and accumulated income. The advisory trustees ordered
an accumulation, and no income payments were made to the bene-
ficiaries at any time. The tax years in question were 1932 and
1933, when the trust was irrevocable. The Board of Tax Appeals
placed its decision of tax liability to the grantor on the ground
provided in Section 167,21 because the income had been accumu-
lated for possible distribution to the grantor, and because he
retained at all times the substance of enjoyment of the trust
property by virtue of his retention of control over it. This deci-
sion of the Board was affirmed on appeal30
Thus the decisions concerning short term trusts prior to the
Clifford case,31 exhibited a conflict between the Board of Tax
Appeals and the courts, the former using the "substance of en-
court having power to alter its decrees with respect to alimony, granted a
decree of divorce to a wife, which provided that the husband set up a trust
for the benefit of his wife, instead of paying alimony to her. The husband
was forced to include the income of the trust in his gross income under
section 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code.
26. Internal Revenue Code (1932) 47 Stat. 221, c. 209 §166, 26 U. S. C. A.§166.
27. Ibid.
28. (1938) 38 B. T. A. 1120.
29. Internal Revenue Code (1932) 47 Stat. 221, c. 209, §167,26 U. S. C. A.
§167.
30. First National Bank of Chicago v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue(C. C. A. 7, 1940) 110 F. (2d) 448. The Board's decision was affirmed after
the decision of Helvering v. Clifford. The opinion of the Circuit Court of
Appeals contained dictum to the effect that the income of the trust for
the tax years in question, was also taxable to the grantor under the rule
of the Clifford case.
31. Helvering v. Clifford (1940) 309 U. S. 331.
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joyment" test, and the latter rejecting it, while affirming or
reversing Board decisions according to some indistinct pattern
of their own. The vagueness of the courts can easily be under-
stood. The "substance of enjoyment" test had been developed
in a different type of case,32 and it had no statutory standing.
Nor could the courts reasonably hold that Sections 166 and 16733
applied to short term trusts, because the Supreme Court had
recognized a distinction between revocable trusts and trusts cer-
tain to be terminated soon.3 4 This was the state of the law when,
in Helvering v. Clifford,3 5 the problem was flatly presented. The
Supreme Court, with much ingenuity, applied the "substance of
enjoyment" test and justified the application by referring it to
the definition of "income" in Section 22 (a) ,36 rather than to the
narrower provisions of Sections 166 and 167.3
7
THE INCLUSION OF TRUST INCOME IN THE GRANTOR'S GROSS
INCOME, UNDER SECTION 22 (a)
The typical situation of income tax liability to the grantor for
the income of the trust is of course, furnished by the Clifford
case. There the grantor created a five year irrevocable trust
for the benefit of his wife, and named himself the trustee with
the following powers: to vote the stock in the corpus, to sell or
mortgage the trust securities without regard to the law of trust
investment, to collect the income, to hold the property in his own
name and to change the distributive provisions in the trust. The
Court in forcing the grantor to include the income from this
short term irrevocable trust in his gross income, under Section
22 (a),38 closed the loophole provided by Section 16639 and Sec-
tion 167.40 The decision seems to be an effort on the part of the
Court to give effect to the purpose of the revenue laws without
additional legislation: that is, to tax income to the person who
32. See supra, Note 25 and accompanying text.
38. Internal Revenue Code (1932) 47 Stat. 221, c. 209 §§166, 167, 26
U. S. C. A. §§166, 167.
34. Helvering v. Wood (1940) 309 U. 5. 344.
35. (1940) 309 U. S. 331. Justice Roberts dissenting.
36. Internal Revenue Code (1939) 53 Stat. 9, §22 (a), 26 U. S. C. A.§22 (a). Provisions similar to 22 (a) have been part of the Internal
Revenue Code from 1913 to the present time.
37. Internal Revenue Code (1932) 47 Stat. 221, c- 209 §§166, 167, 26
U. S. C. A. §§166, 167.
38. Internal Revenue Code (1939) 53 Stat. 9, §22 (a), 26 U. S. C. A.§22 (a).
39. Internal Revenue Code (1932) 47 Stat. 221, c. 209, §166, 26 U. S.
C. A. §166.
40. Internal Revenue Code (1932) 47 Stat. 221, c. 209, §167, 26 U. S.
C. A. §167.
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earns it or creates the right to receive it.41 The conclusion
reached is based on the fact that the grantor is just as much
the real owner of the income after the trust is created, as he
was before. Four factors present in the Clifford case seemed
to signify to the court that the trust was a medium of tax
avoidance: the grantor as trustee; the members of the grantor's
family group as beneficiaries; the length of the trust term; and
the grantor's retention of vast powers over the corpus which
was to return to him at the end of the term. 42
The four factors present in the Clifford case established only
a basic pattern, a broad outline of income tax liability; the suc-
ceeding cases have, to some extent, filled in the interstices. 43
It must be noted, however, that the courts do not consider it
necessary that all four factors be present in any given case;4
one factor or a concurrence of several may establish the grantor's
tak liability for the income of the trust. Generally perhaps the
most important factors are the kinds of control retained by the
grantor, or the length of the term.
. Trustee
The grantor hag'been forced to include the income of the
'trust in his gross income where he not only retains some control
over thd corpus, but also names himself the only trustee.45 The
grant%) must also include the trust income in his gross income
where heis dominant trustee,46 where the grantor co-trustee has
joint power weith his wife to remove the other trustee,47 where
the-grantor-trustee has the power to appoint a new trustee,
8
where the grantor's wife is the trustee,49 and where the trustee
41. Helvering v. Horst (1940) 311 U. S. 112, 119.
42. Pavenstedt, The Broadened Scope of Section 22 (a): The Evolution
of the Clifford Doctrine (1941) 51 Yale L. J. 213, 221.
43. Cory v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C. C. A. 3, 1942) 126 F.(2d) 689.
44. Cory v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C. C. A. 3, 1942) 126
F. (2d) 689; Ray, The Income Tax on Short Term and Revocable Trusts
(1940) 53 Harvard L. Rev. 1322; .Surrey, The Supreme Court and the
Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of the Recent Decisions (1941)
35 Ill. L. Rev. 779; Note (1940) 38 :Mich. L. Rev. 885.
45. Penn v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C. C. A. 8, 1940) 109
F. (2d) 954; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Goulder (C. C. A. 6,
1941) 123 F. (2d) 686; Reuter v. U. S. (1940) 92 Ct. Cl. 74, 34 F. Supp.
1014; Warren v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1941) 45 B. T. A.
379; Pavenstedt, The Broadened Scope of 22 (a): The Evolution of the
Clifford Doctrine (1941) 51 Yale L. J. 213, 228.
46. White v. Higgins (C. C. A. 1, 1940) 116 F. (2d) 312.
47. Hormel v. Helvering (1941) 312 U. S. 552.
48. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Buck (C. C. A. 2, 1941) 120
F. (2d) 775.
49. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Woolley (C. C. A. 2, 1941) 122
F. (2d) 167; Richter v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1942) 46
B. T. A. No. 94.
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is apparently the grantor's attorney and the grantor has retained
certain administrative powers over the trust and may substitute
himself as trustee.50
Relationship of Beneficiaries
The relationship of the beneficiaries to the grantor is important
since the court in the Clifford case recognized that to the head
of the family in the higher brackets " ..... it may well make
but little difference . . . (except income-tax-wise) where por-
tions of the income are routed .... so long as it stays in the
family group." 51 While the family flavor has been the deter-
minative factor of taxability to the grantor in a great many
cases, still the courts will not rest the decision of a case on the
close relationship of the beneficiaries to the grantor, unless the
re-allocation of the income among the family group is clearly
shown by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.5 2 Just what
the relationship of the beneficiaries to the grantor must be, to
constitute them members of his family group is not clear from
the decided cases. Certainly a grantor's wife and children are
members of his family group.53 However in Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Branch,54 the trust made the grantor's wife
the life income beneficiary, and provided for reversion in the
grantor. The grantor was not taxed on the trust income since
the court viewed the transfer as an outright gift and seemed
to ignore the family solidarity concept because---"Congress has
not provided for taxing the family income as a unit.155 A
grantor's father and mother have also been considered mem-
bers of his family group5" although not necessarily living in the
grantor's household. 57 A grantor's nephew has also been con-
sidered a member of his family group.58 On the other hand, a
trust for the benefit of an adult married daughter, living apart
from the grantor, her mother, seemed to indicate to the court
50. Cory v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C. C. A. 3, 1942) 126
F. (2d) 689.
51. (1940) 309 U. S. 331, 336.
52. Kraft v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C. C. A. 3, 1940) 111
F. (2d) 370.
58. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Buck (C. C. A. 2, 1941), 120
F. (2d) 775; Cory v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C. C. A. 3, 1042)
126 F. (2d) 689.
54. (C. C. A. 1, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 985.
55. Id. at 986.
56. Reuter v. U. S. (1940) 92 Ct. Cl. 74, 34 F. Supp. 1014.
57. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Barbour (C. C. A. 2, 1941)
122 F. (2d) 165.
58. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Woolley (C. C. A. 2, 1941) 122
F. (2d) 167.
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no family flavor.,, Likewise, where the beneficiaries were the
sister-in-law and uncle of the grantor, the court found that the
relationship was not sufficiently close to justify the application
of the Clifford rule. 0 The courts tend to examine carefully the
relationship of the beneficiaries to the grantor of the trust, and
the absence of the family element alone, has been the determina-
tive factor in holding the grantor not liable for income taxes6±
Length of the Term
While the tendency is toward requiring the grantor of the
short term trust to include the trust income in his gross income,
the length of the term is not conclusive. The cases do not make
a clear distinction between a short term and a long term. Trusts
ranging from three years62 to ten years63 have been held short
term trusts; the Board of Tax Appeals has recently held that
even a trust for the life of the beneficiaries with reversion in
the grantor, and revocable by his wife, who was a beneficiary,
is within the rule of the Clifford case. The Board said:
"--the function of the length of the trust term is no more
than to act as an indicator or contributing factor in the
determination of the other criteria."6'
Again in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Buck," even
though the wife was the life income beneficiary, and after her
death the income and finally the corpus was to go to her chil-
dren, the grantor was held liable for the income tax since he
retained broad powers of control. On the other hand the grantor
of a twenty year trust was not compelled to include the income
of the trust in his gross income.6 The grantor also escaped the
income tax on a three year trust which was later extended to
a life estate in the income for the beneficiary in the Boic case ;"7
the decision was rested on the fact that the grantor retained only
slight powers of control, and no significance was attached to the
length of the term.
59. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Armour (C. C. A. 7, 1942)
125 F. (2d) 467.
60. Milbank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1940) 41 B. T. A.
1014.
61. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Chamberlain (C. C. A. 2,
1941) 121 F. (2d) 765.
62. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Woolley (C. C. A. 2, 1941)
122 F. (2d) 167.
63. Cory v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C. C. A. 3, 1942) 126
F. (2d) 689.
64. Howard Phipps v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1942) 47
B. T. A. No. 53.
65. (C. C. A. 2, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 775.
66. Jones v. Norris (C. C. A. 10, 1941) 122 F. (2d) 6.
67. Mary Louise Bok (1942) 46 B. T. A. 678.
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Control
Since the essence of liability to the grantor is ownership, it is
important to consider just what controls retained by him will
have this result. Even the grantor's unlimited power of control,
by itself will not make him liable for the income tax, if the trust
is an outright gift, so that he can receive no economic benefits
from it.68 However, it is evident from the decided cases that not
every control indicative of ownership need be present in order
to result in taxability to the grantor. 9 The grantor has been
taxed where he retains the power to direct trust investments
and vote the stock in the corpus,70 but the courts seemingly make
no distinction, although the opportunity has been presented, be-
tween closely held stock or stock in a family corporation, and
stock in a quasi-public corporation. In Helvering v. Stuart,71
however, the court stated that it could not regard as significant
the fact that the corpus was composed of stock in a company in
which the grantors were high officers because there were no
findings, on this point, by the Board of Tax Appeals; but per-
haps this is an indication by the court of its willingness to con-
sider this problem if properly presented.
The grantor also seems to be liable for the income tax where
he can revest the principal in himself72 or where he retains the
right to change the distributive provisions of the trust, or the
beneficiaries, even though the right of alteration could not result
in payments of income to the grantor during the life of the bene-
ficiary.7 On the other hand, in Commissioner v. Brown,- the
grantor could not revoke, but retained power to change the bene-
ficiaries or modify their interests, and even the power to return
the income to his family group. The income for the tax years in
question was not used for the members of the grantor's family
group and the grantor was not taxed, although the case was
afterwards remanded to the Board on other grounds.
The grantor has been held liable where he retains the power
to borrow from the trust corpus, even though the right to bor-
row is expressly for the protection of the trust estate.75 On the
68. Jones v. Norris (C. C. A. 10, 1941) 122 F. (2d) 6.
69. McKnight v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C. C. A. 8, 1941)
128 F. (2d) 240.
70. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Cory (C. C. A. 3, 1942) 126
F. (2d) 689.
71. Helvering v. Stuart (1942) 63 S. Ct. 140, 87 L. Ed. 109.
72. White v. Higgins (C. C. A. 1, 1940) 116 F.- (2d) 312.
73. Stein v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1940) 41 B. T. A. 994.
74. (C. C. A. 3, 1941) 122 F. (2d) 800.
75. First National Bank of Chicago v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue(C. C. A. 7, 1940) 110 F. (2d) 448.
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other hand, in the Branck case,71 the grantor had pledged the
stock in the corpus for his individual debt before he created the
trust, and he retained the power to repledge the stock in the
corpus; but this seemed unimportant to the court, since he
covenanted to reimburse the trust estate for any loss resulting
from the transaction. The retention of the right to appoint a
trustee also, in part, resulted in the grantor's tax liability al-
though the power was limited to the naming of a substitute
trustee,77 or to the appointment of additional trustees.7 8 Lia-
bility to the grantor has also resulted where he retained the
right to remove a trustee.7 9 A grantor has been held liable under
Section 22 (a) for the income taxes where he retains the power
to buy the trust property at his own price8o (though this basis
for the result was not necessary, since this had been held "a
power to revest" the corpus in the grantor within the scope of
Section 16681).
There are a few cases of short term trusts for the benefit of
members of the grantor's immediate family, where the grantor
has retained some control over the trust property, which have
not resulted in taxability to the grantor. Nothwithstanding
rather broad powers of control retained by the grantor, he was
not held liable in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Branch;82
there the beneficiary had the power to terminate the trust and
appoint it to new uses, or to vest the corpus in herself. In Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue v. Bateman,8s there was no possi-
bility of reverter of the trust corpus or of the income to the
grantor, nor any economic control reserved to the grantor save
a power of appointment, and the trust was for a long term.
In a suit to determine the grantor's liability for the accumulate
income, the power of appointment was held insufficient to bring
the case within the scope of the Clifford rule. The grantor has
also escaped liability where he is neither a trustee nor retains
any control-over the trustee.8 4
The Court in the Clifford case did not see the necessity of
76. (C. C. A. 1, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 985, 132 A. L. R. 839.
77. Cory v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C. C. A. 3, 1942) 126
F. (2d) 689.
'78. Stein v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1940) 41 B. T. A. 994.
79. Deuble v. Commissioner (1940) 42 B. T. A. 277.
80. Commissioner v. Warren (1941) 45 B. T. A. 379.
81. Chandler V. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C. C. A. 3, 1941)
119 F. (2d) 623.
82. (C. C. A. 1, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 985, 132 A. L. R. 839.
83. (C. C. A. 1, 1942) 127 F. (2d) 266.
84. Suihr v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C. C. A. 6, 1942) 126
F. (2d) 283.
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applying the rationale of the assignment of income80 5 cases to
the problem of taxing the income from a short term irrevocable
trust to the grantor since Section 22 (a) adequately determined
his liability. 6 But the reasoning in the assignment of income
cases has been helpful to the courts in achieving the same result
in long term trust cases where the grantor has retained control.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Buck' the grantor
could vote the stock in the corpus, advise the trustee how to exer-
cise his powers, remove the trustee and control all dispositions
of the corpus except that he might not revoke the trust, or revest
principal or income in himself. The trust gave a life estate in
the income to his wife, with ultimate distribution to their chil-
dren upon her death. The court taxed the trust income to the
grantor on the theory that the grantor's retention of the power
to change the beneficial interests was the equivalent of owner-
ship, even though his only reversion was the share of any bene-
ficiary who pre-deceased him. In reaching this result, the court
relied upon Helvering v. Horst,8 in which the court stated that
the power to make gifts is a satisfaction of economic worth. An
opposite result was apparently reached in Jones v. Norris,81 9 upon
very similar facts. The only distinguishing factor is that the
grantor in the Jones case could not get back the corpus or in-
come under any conditions. Nevertheless the court in the Jones
case failed to recognize the power to make gifts as "a satisfac-
tion of economic worth,"90 and therefore a basis for taxation
to the grantor. Again in Helvering v. Stuart9l the opportunity
was presented for the application of the Horst rule. Here two
85. Contemporaneous with the development of the Clifford rule, the
courts were using Section 22 (a) as a basis for the decision of the assign-
ment of income cases. Helvering v. Horst (1940) 311 U. S. 113, is a
typical case. There, a taxpayer gave coupons of bonds to his son before
they had matured. Ordinarily a taxpayer who acquires a right to receive
income is taxed on it when it is received, regardless of when the right to
receive it is accrued. But under the doctrine of the Horst case, when the
donor procures the payment of the income to another, he is realizing the
income and must therefore, pay the income tax upon it, since the power to
dispose of the income is the equivalent of ownership of it.
There is a close analogy between the short term irrevocable trust for
the benefit of the grantor's immediate family, where the grantor retains
not only control of the corpus, but also a reversion, and the assignment or
gift of income not yet received. In neither situation has the grantor dis-
posed of the res which produced the income.
96. (1940) 309 U. S. 331, 338.
87. (C. C. A. 2, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 775.
88. (1940) 311 U. S. 113, 119.
89. (C. C. A. 10, 1941) 122 F. (2d) 6.
90. Commissioner v. Buck (C. C. A. 2, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 775, 777.
91. (1942) 63 S. Ct. 140, 87 L. Ed. 109. Justices Stone, Black, and
Douglas dissented in the case of the trust for adult children.
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brothers created trusts for the benefit of their children; the
beneficiaries in one trust were minors, while the beneficiaries
of the other were adults. The trust for the adult children was
revocable by the grantor at first, but he subsequently gave up
this power, and the trustees, (the grantor, his wife, and brother)
had powers of absolute ownership. They were to distribute in-
come to the beneficiaries within their discretion, and to accumu-
late the rest of it. After a fifteen year period the beneficiaries
were to get the income for life, and the corpus was to go to
their issue, or to named beneficiaries. The Court in refusing to
apply the rule of the Horst case seemed to state a limitation to
it: These distributions and accumulations it reasoned were to
be used for the economic advantage of the children and would
satisfy the normal desire of a parent to make gifts to his chil-
dren, but this parental motive was a 'non-material' satisfaction
and was insufficient to constitute economic gain realized by or
realizable by the grantor.92
CONCLUSION
It is hard to ascertain the precise limits of the applicability
of the Clifford rule and the rationale of the assignment of in-
come cases. But under the latest pronouncement of the Supreme
Court,93 it is still safe, from an income tax point of view, for a
grantor to create a trust for the members of his family, if the
trust is an out and out gift. A complicating factor in the pat-
tern of the income taxation of trusts has recently been added by
the Revenue Act of 1942. This is the amendment of Section 22
(b) (3).94 Until the change was made, property acquired by
gifts, bequests or devises was excluded from the taxpayer's gross
income, although the income from such property was included
in gross income. The recent amendment provides that property
acquired by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance need not be in-
cluded in the taxpayer's gross income unless the transfer is a
gift, bequest, devise or inheritance of income; in this event the
taxpayer is required to include the value of the property in his
gross income. No change has been made respecting the income
from gifts, bequests, devises, or inheritances. There are two pos-
sible constructions of Section 22 (b) (3) 1- as amended; the more
unlikely construction would be tantamount to overruling by
legislation, the cases which have slowly evolved the principle
92. Helvering v. Stuart (1942) 63 S. Ct. 140, 147, 87 L. Ed. 109, 116.
93. Helvering v. Stuart (1942) 63 S. Ct. 140, 87 L. Ed. 109.
94. Internal Revenue Code (1942 Supp.) 26 U. S. C. A. § 22 (b) (3).
95. Ibid.
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of taxing income to the person who earned it or created the
right to receive it.16 A more logical construction is that Congress
intended not to take away grantor liability for the tax where it
already exists, but perhaps to add grantee liability in the situa-
tions where the exclusion is no longer permitted.
VmGnA T. muns
96. Helvering v. Horst (1940) 311 U. S. 113, 119.
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